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THE RATE BASE FOR RATE REGULATION
What is the correct rate base for the regulation of the rates
of public utilities, railways and other public callings?
According to the common law of public callings, which was
formulated by the great English judges, Hale,1 Holt 2 and
Mansfield,3 and which has been witnessing great development in
recent times, 4 a business affected with a public interest (public
calling) is entitled to a reasonable return for its services5 and
is bound to render such services for reasonable compensation.6
It has been suggested that there is a spread, or margin, between
the (non-confiscatory) return to which the business is entitled
and the (non-monopolistic) compensation which the consumer
may be required to pay,7 but this does not seem to be the view
of the United States Supreme Court as announced when inter-
preting and upholding the recapture clause of the 1920 Trans-
portation Act.8 Any rates which do not yield the reasonable
return to which the business is entitled (and apparently any
rates which yield more than the consumer should pay) are a
taking of property without due process of law, as that term is
now defined by the United States Supreme Court,9 and may be
set aside by the Supreme Court,' 0 or recaptured.
In the determination of whether or not a business or the pub-
lic is being deprived of its property without due process of law,
the courts must find: (1) what is the proper rate, and (2)
what is the proper rate base. If the charges of the business
bring enough return to give what the courts regard as a proper
rate on a proper rate base they are not confiscatory and the
business cannot complain; if they bring in no more than this,
the customer cannot complain. The courts have been inclined
to hold that the rate of return should in a general way conform
I Allnut v. Inglis (1810), 12 East 527.
2 Coggs v. Bernard (1703), 2 Ld. Raym. 909.
3Forward v. Pittard (1785), 1 T. R. 27.
4 Munn v. Illinois (1876), 94 U. S. 113.
5 Railroad Commission Cases (1886), 116 U. S. 307.
6 Brass v. North Dakota (1894), 153 U. S. 391; German-Alliance Ins.
Co. v. Lewis (1914), 233 U. S. 389; Block v. Hirsh (1921), 256 U. S. 135.
7 12 Iowa Law Rev. 268.
8 Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. v. United States (1924), 263 U. S. 456.
9 74 U. of Pa. Law Rev. 331.
10 Chicago etc. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota etc. Com. (1890), 134 U. S. 418;
Reagan v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co. (1894), 154 U. S. 362; Allgeyer v.
Louisiana (1897), 165 U. S. 578.
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to the interest rate, and six or seven per cent has generally
been allowed. If a rate lower than six per cent, say four per
cent (because of the stability characteristic of utilities), would
induce a flow of such investment money as is necessary in the
public utility field, such a rate would seem to be reasonable and
proper. 1 But this rate of return must be a rate upon something
which we call a base.
What is the proper rate base for this rate? Is it the capitali-
zation of the business? Is it the original cost? Is it the value
of the plant for purposes of taxation? Is it the prudent invest-
ment? Is it the reproduction cost? Is it the fair value? The
courts have found it more difficult to agree upon the rate base
than upon the rate. Capitalization, 12 original cost and value for
taxation'3 have allbeen used by different commissions, but the
three rate bases which have met with the greatest approval by
commissions, courts and law writers have been the prudent in-
vestment, reproduction cost and fair value. The prudent invest-
ment theory, which makes the rate base the amount which would
be normally paid for all the property devoted to the public ser-
vice (that is, the original cost if wise and prudent), has been
adopted by some state commissions, notably Massachusetts, 14
been advocated by Justices Brandeis and Holmes in a strong dis-
senting opinion in the case of State of Missouri ex rel South-
western Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission of
Missouri,'5 and has had the almost unanimous support of legal
writers.16 The reproduction. cost theory as to the rate base has
been-the most widely adopted by commissions17 and courts. 18 The
fair value theory as to the rate base has been promulgated and
adhered to until quite recently by the United States Supreme
Court.' 9
11 25 Jour. of Pol. Ec. 544; 124 I. C. C. 30, 54.
12 (1923) 262 U. S. 302 n. 14.
13 (1916D) Pub. Util. Rep. 725.
14 (1923) 262 U. S. 302 n. 15.
15 (1923) 262 U. S. 289.
16 Edward C. Goddard, "Public Utility Valuation," 15 Mich. Law Rev.
205; Robert L. Hale, "The Physical Value Fallacy in Rate Cases," 30 Yale
Law Jour. 710; Donald R. Richberg, "A Permanent Basis for Rale Regula-
tion," 31 Yale Law Jour. 263; Robert H. Whitten, "Fair Value for Rate
Purposes," 27 Harv. Law Rev. 419; Henry W. Edgerton, "Value of the
Service as a Factor in Rate Making," 32 Harv. Law Reg. 516; Gerard C.
Henderson, "Railway Valuation and the Courts," 33 Harv. Law Rev. 902.
17 (1923) 262 U. S. 301, n. 14.
18 Steenerson v. Great Nor. Ry. Co. (1897), 69 Minn. 353.
19Smyth v. Ames (1898), 169 U. S. 466; Minnesota Rate Cases (1913),
230 U. S. 352.
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The history of the attitude of the United States Supreme Court
upon this subject is interesting.
In the celebrated case of Smyth v. Ames 20 the Supreme
Court first announced fair value as its choice of a rate base, say-
ing that:
"And in order to ascertain that value, the original cost of construction,
the amount expended in permanent improvement, the amount and market
value of its bonds and stocks, the present as compared with the original
cost of construction, the probable earning capacity of the property under
particular rates prescribed by statute, and the sum required to meet oper-
ating expenses, are all matters for consideration, and are to ber given such
weight as may be just and right in the case. We do not say that there may
not be other matters to be regarded in estimating the value of the prop-
erty."
In the equally celebrated Minnesota Rate Cases, 21 the Supreme
Court seemed to continue to wallow in the uncertainties of the
kaleidoscopic rule of Smyth v. Ames, but made fair value fair
present value and required depreciation to be considered along
with reproduction cost.
In the case of State of Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell
Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission of Missouri,22 a
majority of the Supreme Court still held that fair value should
represent the rate base, but held that in computing it some con-
sideration must be given to the cost of reproduction at the pres-
ent time, and that where a commission had given no weight to
this a case must be reversed; but two justices dissented in favor
of prudent investment.
In the case of the Georgia Railway and Power Co. v. Railroad
Commission of Georgia,23 the Supreme Court again held present
fair value the rate base and sustained a commission and lower
court where they had given careful attention to reproduction
cost but had refused to make this any part of the measure of
value.
But, in the Bluefield Water Works and L Co. v. Public Service
Commission of West Virginia,24 a majority of the Supreme
Court, while adhering to the present fair value rule, reversed
the Supreme Court of West Virginia because it had not accorded
the proper if any weight to the cost of reproduction new (at the
then enhanced costs over those which had prevailed before the
war) less depreciation.
This was the state of the law, so far as concerned the United
20 Supra.
21 Supra.
22 (1923) 262 U. S. 276.
23 (1923) 262 U. S. 625.
24 (1923) 262 U. S. 679.
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States Supreme Court up to the decision of the case of McCardle
v. Indianapolis Water Co. 25 During all of this time but espe-
cially since the World War constant pressure had been brought
to bear upon the court to adopt reproduction cost less deprecia-
tion as the sole test of fair value, evidently on the theory that
reproduction cost can always be found-since it is a pure guess
-while original cost and the other items named in the rule of
Smyth v. Ames cannot always be found-since they are facts;
and at least two justices already accepted or were won over to
this view.26 But the rest of the court either adhered to the ori-
ginal fair value rule or to the prudent investment rule.
Then came the case of MeCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co. 27
in November, 1926. This case began with a petition by the In-
dianapolis Water Company for an increase of rates. Thereupon
the Public Service Commission of Indiana valued the property
of the Indianapolis Water Company as of May 31, 1923, at not
less than $15,260,240, fixed seven per cent as the reasonable rate
of return, and granted a new schedule of rates higher than the
old rates but not as high as asked by the Company. The Com-
pany then sued for an injunction against the Commission to
restrain the enforcement of the order of the Commission on the
ground that the rates prescribed were confiscatory. The trial
court found the fair value of the property to be not less than
$19,000,000, that the rates were confiscatory, and enjoined the
enforcement of the order, evidently on the theory that spot re-
production cost is the legal or conclusive evidence of value. At
any rate, on appeal by the Commission and the City of Indian-
apolis, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Butler,
adopted this view, held that spot reproduction cost of all the
Company's properties, including the present value of land and
water rights and the cost of constructing the plant at prices for
material and labor prevailing on the calendar day of valuation
(and an honest and intelligent forecast of future wages and
prices), together with a going concern value of nine and one-
half per cent of the value of the physical property, was the
proper rate base, seven per cent a fair rate, so as to give a rea-
sonable return at the time and for a reasonable time in the
future, and affirmed the decree.
Thus, in this case, a majority of the United States Supreme
Court seems to have gone entirely over to the theory of repro-
25 (1926) 47 Sup. Ct. 144.
26 Ga. R. R. & P. Co. v. R. R. Com. of Ga., supra (dissent); Bluefield
Water Works & I. Co. v. Pub. Ser. Com. of W. Va., supra.
27 Supra.
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duction cost as the correct rate base, and to have defined this as
reproduction cost new on the day of valuation, not the period of
time it would require to construct the plant to have it in opera-
tion on the valuation date, less depreciation, and with a going
concern value-not measured by the usual physical overheads
for assembling the plant and organization expenses, as the Su-
preme Court had previously done2s-but an intangbile measured
by a fixed percentage of the physical value added to the physical
value of the property. Of course the court did not actually say
that it repudiated prudent investment for all time and in all
cases, and there is a bare possibility that a majority of the
Supreme Court may feel that it is not bound by the opinion of
Justice Butler in a similar case.29
In spite of the decision in the Indianapolis Water case given
above, the Interstate Commerce Commission, in what has been
called "the greatest lawsuit in history,"30 the St. Louis and
O'Fallon Railroad case,31 declined to abide by the latest decision
of the Supreme Court when told to do so only once and refused
to apply reproduction cost as the rate base for the regulation of
the rates of the railways of the United States, but instead
adopted the prudent investment as the rate base (modified by
the split inventory rule so as to apply the reproduction cost up
to the time of the World War and prudent investment since that
time). The railroads have appealed from the decision of the
Interstate Commerce Commission to the United States Supreme
Court.
Will the Supreme Court stand pat on its Indianapolis Water
Co. decision and apply it to the railroads, or when confronted
with this larger application of its rule will it, appalled, change
its mind as to the correctness of its rule? If it follows the In-
dianapolis Water case as a precedent it will thereby authorize
the railroads of the country to raise their rates so as to require
the people of the United States to pay to them a billion dollars
a year more than at present. If it overrules the Indianapolis
Water case, not only will the railroads not obtain this income
but many of the railroads will have to turn back to the Govern-
ment under the recapture clause of the Transportation Act of
192032 enormous sums of money already earned in excess earn-
28 Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines (1915), 238 U. S. 53; Galveston
Elec. Co. v. Galveston (1922), 258 U. S. 388.
29 Excess Income of St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry. Co., 124 I. C. C. 52.
30 147 Outlook 149.
31 Excess Income of St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry. Co., 124 I. C. C. 3.
32 Sec. 422, 15a (3), (4), (5), (6); Comp. Stat. U. S. 1916, 1923 Sup.,
8583a (3), (4), (5), (6).
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ings. The Supreme Court will either have to apply the doctrine
of the Indianapolis Water case to the railroads or overrule it,
for we cannot have for rate regulation purposes one rate base
for one public calling and another rate base for another public
calling.
Hence, perhaps the most important legal question before the
people of the United States today is, what is the correct rate
base for the regulation of the rates of public callings? What
should be the final decision of the United States Supreme Court
on this question?
Clearly the rate base cannot be either capitalization, or ori-
ginal cost, or value for taxation. Too much capital stock has
been watered. Too much original cost has been padded for pro-
moters and insiders. Value for taxation would make rate regu-
lation square with tax administration, but it has too little sup-
port in authority and public opinion.
Fair value as a rate base cannot be adopted if it is to be com-
pounded of all the diverse elements in the rule of Smyth v. Ames.
To determine fair value by considering the cost of producing the
utility, what it should have cost, what it would cost to reproduce
it, and other as diverse elements, is to determine the impossible.
Justice Brandeis38 has conclusively pointed out that "value can-
not be a composite of all these elements." They are mutually
exclusive. They "lead to widely different results." If fair
value is to be determined solely by any one of these elements,
as prudent investment, or reproduction cost, one of these terms
should be employed. Railways and other utilities do not have
a market value, so that this method of appraising value cannot
be pursued. Hence unless the Supreme Court can make fair
value something less than a composite of a lot of mutually ex-
clusive things or something more than some one of other rate
bases, fair value as a rate base is not worthy of consideration,
and should be relegated forever to the limbo of legal curiosities.
Reproduction cost as a rate base has three very fundamental
objections, its unfairness, its uncertainty, and its impracticality.
After a period of inflation such as has followed the World War,
this rate base would hand the public utilities wealth unearned
and undreamed of (probably a sum greater than our present
national debt-about 19 billions).34 It would probably treble
all the investments they ever put into the enterprises, and guar-
antee them a reasonable return thereon. Huge profits would
occur without any change in property but simply from a shifting
83 Southwestern Bell Case, supra.
84 Excess Income of St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry. Co., 124 I. C. C. 32.
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of general price levels. No wonder utility men are for such a
money-making scheme. They urge that they should not be
forced to make earnings based on dollars originally invested in
property when those dollars have since declined to a value of
one-third. Yet, if they had loaned those dollars they would not
expect to get back three times as many with interest thereon,
and where they have borrowed money they do not expect to pay
back more than they borrowed. Reproduction cost now favors
the railways and other public callings. Consequently they are
for it, and the public is against it. If the situation were re-
versed, as after a period of deflation, they would be against it,
and the public would be for it. The question is not what either
wants, but what is right. Reproduction cost is sure to be unfair
either to the public or to the public calling, and the chances are
it will be unfair to the public. But the chief objection to repro-
duction cost is its uncertainty. It is nothing but a guess.85 The
engineering estimates required are airy calculations on impos-
sible assumptions. The accounting studies used are unethical.
The economic principles underlying it are antagonistic to estab-
lished economic laws. Judicial opinions in regard to it have
been loquacious nothingness, or curt fallaciousness. And now,
in addition to the usual imaginative guessing involved in it, the
Supreme Court has added guessing upon the forecast of prices
in the future, spot, and a new going concern value. The rate
must be more or less guess-work, since it must vary with the
market investment rate. If the rate base also is to be guess-
work, both the rate and the rate base are uncertain, and the mat-
ter of rate regulation will be too much a matter of guess-work.
35 Reproduction cost is determined by including "percentages for engi-
neering services never rendered, hypothetical efficiency of unknown labor,
conjectural depreciation, opinion as to the condition of property, the sup-
posed action of the elements, whether superintendence is wise or foolish,
and the investment improvident or frugal. It is based upon prophecy in-
stead of reality; it depends upon half truths instead of upon reliable data;
it rises at best only to the plane of dignified guessing." Re Michigan State
Tel. Co. (1921C), Pub. Util. Rep. 545, 554. "The theory is not of reproduc-
tion of an equally efficient plant but an identical plant, under present condi-
tions, not conditions when the plant was built. Much of the property (aban-
doned and obsolete) no one would want to reproduce. Items of expense
never incurred are included in reproduction new. In reproduction cost we
have to depend entirely upon conjecture and assumptions which may have
never in reality existed and never will." McGregor-Nees H. Co. v. Spring-
field Gas & El. Co., 1 Pub. Ser. Com. 468, 528 (Mo. 1914). "Each step in
the process of estimating the cost of reproduction or replacement, involves
forming an opinion, or exercising judgment, as distinguished from ascer-
taining facts." Brandeis in State of Missouri v. Public Service Commission,
supra.
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Reproduction cost is so impractical and cumbersome it-is almost
unworkable, as witness the difficulty of making an inventory of
the railways. These three objections are fatal to reproduction
cost as a rate base.
Prudent investment as a rate base is a reasonably fixed quan-
tity, and it also is fair to the public as well as to the public call-
ings. It escapes the evils of reproduction cost on the one hand
and of capitalization and original cost on the other. Accounting
problems are simplified, for the prudent original cost once found
always stands and thereafter only the cost of new additions and
improvements have to be found. Of course public callings, even
if housing were generally made a public calling, 6 would not
under this theory be able to capitalize the unearned increment,
but public callings-whatever may be true of other businesses-
have never been entitled to do this; they are only entitled to
reasonable compensation upon the property they have devoted
to a public use. When they devote their property to a public
use, taking over a function of the state and gaining unusual
favors, they do so upon the implied condition that in return
therefore they shall get only such reasonable return. If they do
not wish to become a public calling upon this condition they
should not become a public calling. Business is. only too willing
to become a public calling upon this condition. After having
done so, it should be willing to play fair thereafter.
It would seem, then, that the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion is right and the United States Supreme Court has been
wrong as to what is the correct rate base for the regulation of
the rates of public callings; that the decision in the case of Mc-
Cardle v. Indianapolis Water Co. was erroneous and that the
United States Supreme Court should now adopt for the rate base
in rate regulation cases the prudent investment theory either in
its true form, or where that cannot be done for lack of evidence
as to the past in some modified form.
3 7
HUGH EVANDER WILLIS.
Indiana University School of Law.
36 Block v. Hirsh (1921), 256 U. S. 135.
37 If the United States Supreme Court does not do this, but adopts
reproduction cost as the rate base for the regulation of the rates of all
public callings, including the railways, its decision will be liable to stir up
so much opposition as to result in all cases in the substitution for govern-
mental regulation of business affected with a public interest under the due
process clause of either, (1) government ownership and operation, or (2)
government ownership with private operation, or (3) governmental regu-
lation by private contract between governmental subdivisions and different
public callings under the contract clause of the constitution, as now advo-
cated in connection with Bowlder Dam, Muscle Shoals and the Lakes to
Ocean waterway.
